COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, is to ascertain "first
the damage to the fee as if it were
owned entire and unincumbered
by one person, and then to apportion that amount among all the
estates and interests which such
persons have in the property." In
this case it appeared that an award
was made to the landlord of property taken for highway purposes,

the award comprising an item for
damages to buildings and another
for damages to the land. The
tenant, who had erected the buildings, was given by the lease the
privilege of removal; and, in an action against the landlord, he was
held entitled to the amount awarded
to the landlord as damages to the
buildings.
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CollateralInheritanceTax-Estate ofNon-Resident M4ember of Linited
Partnership--Ac of ,May 6, z887.
Under the Act of May 6, 1887, P. L., 79, the interest of a nonresident deceased member of a limited partnership association is liable
to the collateral inheritance tax where the real and personal property of
the association is situated within the State.
A limited partnership association consisted of three members, two of
whom were residents of Pennsylvania, and one of Maryland. The capital
of the association was made up of land in Pennsylvania, valued at
$r9o,ooo, and personal property valued at $240,3oo. The business consisted largely of buying and selling grain, flour, etc., in Pennsylvania
and elsewhere. The non-resident member, by his will, bequeathed to his
partners, who were also his brothers, all his interest in the association,
including "all the property, real and personal, notes, stocks, bonds and
accounts."

Held, that the interest of the deceased member was liable to the
collateral inheritance tax.

Opinion by Mr. Justice STRRETrT.
1151 Pa.. I, Oct. 3, 1892.
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laws the relation of the person
It is the pleasure of the sovereign
-power of the State, which con- claiming the estate to the decedent
tinues the ownership in dead men's constitutes the ground upon which
property to those appointed, either the abatement is authorized: Eyre
by the owner himself or the State v. Jacob, 14 Gratt., 427; Miller v.
Tyson v.
by its intestate laws; hence, hav- Comm., 27 Gratt., io;
ing the power to take all or give State, 28 Md., 577; Matter of Howard, 5 Dem., 483; Pullen v. Comall, no one will dispute the right
missioners, 66 N. C., 361; Carpenter
to reserve a portion of that which
is given to meet the nantd of v. Pa., 17 Howard, 456; Peter v.
government: Alvaney v Powell, 2 Lynchburg, 76 Va., 927; Matter of
McPherson, io4 N. Y., 3o6; State
Jones' Eq., 51; Dalyrymple's Ap.,
v. Dalyrymple, 70 Md., 294; Walio Md., I5O; Strode v. Comm., 52
lace v. Myers, 38 Fed Rep., 184;
Pa., 189. This is the theory upon
which collateral inheritance tax or In re Short's Est., i6 Pa., 63;
Strode v. Comm., 52 Pa., i8I; Cly(more properly) succession duty,
mer v. Same, Id., 189; Comm. vu.
-is imposed.
The close analogy between the Maury, 82 Va., 883; Comm. v. Hervicesima hereditalum el legato- man, I6 W. V. C., 212. Payment
rum, which Augustus Caesar pro- of the tax is a condition precedent
to the collateral beneficiary receivposed to the Roman Senate for
-the support of the army, and the ing the estate. Strode v. Comm.,
modem succession duty, leaves no 52 Pa., 151; Clymer's Ap., Id., i89.
-doubt as to the origin of the sys"The right to take property by
tem. Gibbon, the historian, who devise or descent is the creation
held office under Lord NORTH be- of the law, and secured and protween 1776 and 1780, probably sug- tected by its authority. The legisgested to that premier the political lature might, if it saw proper,
wisdom of this tax as a source of restrict the sucession to a deced-revenue, and in 1780 an enact- ant's estate, either by devise or
ment was passed taxing legacies to descent to a particular class of his
which the modem Succession Duty kindred, say to his lineal descendants and ascendants; it might imActs of England, and the Collateral
Inheritance Tax Laws, adopted by pose terms and conditions upon
nine States in the Union, trace which collateral relations may be
their parentage: Gibbon's Decline permitted to take it; or it may toand Fall, Vol. I, p. 133; 3 Dowell's morrow, if it pleases, absolutely
Hist. of Taxation in England, 48; repeal the statute of wills and that
Dos Passos on Collat. Iuh. Tax, of descents and distributions, and
P. 7; Hanson's Probate Duties, p. declare that upon the death of a
i3; William's Case, 3 Bland's Ch. party his property shall be applied
to the payment of his debts, and
(Md.', 259.
the residue appropriated to public
It is not a tax upon the property
itself, but upon the transmission or uses:" Miller's Elcrs. v. Commonthe right to succeed to the interests wealth, 27 Gratt. (Va.), 117.
Liability for the tax attaches eo
of the deceased owner, and in the
modern collateral inheritance tax instante the death of the testator,
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wherever the property may be situate; and if it is not chargeable
then, no subsequent importation of
it into the taxing State for purposes
of administration will render it so:
Hood's Ap., -9 Harris, io6; Drayton's Ap., 61 Pa., X76.
In Pennsylvania it has been
somewhat anomanously held that
the Collateral Inheritance Tax imposed by the Act of May 6, 1887,
P. L. 79, is a direct tax upon the
property devised to or inherited by
collaterals in the hands of the
devisees or heirs, and not merely a
succession tax imposed upon the
persons thus succeeding to real or
personal estate: Bittinger's Est,
In that case the
129 Pa., 338.
devisor of land situate in Maryland
was domiciled at the time of his
death in Pennsylvania, and the
devisee of the land a Pennsylvania corporation. It was held
that the Pennsylvania statute had
no power to tax land beyond its
territorial limits. PAXSON, C. J.:
"Does it make any difference that
the devis, e is a Pennsylvania corporation? We think not. It may
be that the State might impose a
succession tax upon every citizen
of the State who succeeds to either
real or personal estate, from whatever source received. This id not
such a tax, however: " Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 Pa., 142.
In view of the Federal decisions
fixing the status of this form of
taxation, it seems absurd to regard
succession charges as property
taxes: Schooley v. Rew, 23 Wall.,
331; Society v. Coite, 6 Wall, 594;
Institufion v. Mass., Id., 681; Mager
v. Grima, 8 How., 49; Carpenter v.
Pennsylvania, 17 How., 436. It is
upon the idea that the tax is the
price paid for the privilege of succession that its constitutionality

has been upheld when applied to&
the transmission of United States
securities: Wallace v. Myers, 38
Fed. Rep., 184; Strode v. Comm.,
52 Pa., 189; Clymer's Ap., 52 Pa.,
i8g; Matter of Howard, 5 Dem. (N.
Y.), 483., cf. Tyson v. State, 2&
Md., 578; and in Clymer's Ap.
(supbra) it was held that the tax
was valid though the legatees
elected to accept specific securitiesof the national government-a conclusion which never could have
been reached were the tax a direct
change on the property.
Again, it is only upon the succession duty theory that property
exempt by law from other forms of'
taxation can constitutionally be
held liable for the payment of collateral inheritance tax: Com. v.
Kernan, 16 W. N. C., 21o; Barringer v,. Cowan, 2 Jones (Eq.), N.
C., 51; Miller's Excrs. v. Comm., 27
Gratt. (Va.), IIo.
Inasmuch as it is a well-settled
principle of statutory interpretation that where a legislative enactment is susceptible of two different
constructions, one of which renders.
it valid, the other invalid, that
which renders it valid is to be
adopted, 'the Supreme Court in
Bettinger's Appeal might more
properly have placed that construction upon the act of 1887, which
was necessary to'render it constitutional, and in accordance with the
spirit of its enactment.
I. Real Properiy.-The proposition that real property cannot be
taxed or charged except in the
jurisdiction where it is situate, applies equally as well to the succession duty laws as to other forms
of taxation: Bittenger's Ap., 129.
Pa., 336 ; 24 W. N. C., 273 ; S. C.,
iS At. Rep., 132; Kintzing v.
Hutchinson, 34 Leg. Int., 365
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Matter of Wolfe, 19 N. Y. St., 263 ;
Lorillard v. People, 6 Dem., 268;
Estate of Dewey, N. Y. Law Jour.
(1889); Drayton's Ap., 61 Pa., 172;
Com. v. Coleman, 52 Pa., 468;
368; Hood's Est., 21 Pa., io6.
In view, therefore, of the certainty with which this rule has
been established, an examination
of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Miller's

devised by a domestic will to persons here does not devolve by force
of the will nor of the domestic law,
but by the permission of the State
where the land is situate, and, not
depending upon the domestic law,
cannot legally, nor in good conscience, be asked to pay the price
(See opinion of
of succession.
GRAY, J., in re Swift's Est, 32 N.

Pa., 321, occasions some

The Court of Appeals ,of New
York in the very recent case of In
re Swift's Trusts, 32 N. E. Rep.,
io96 (Jan. 25, 1892), dealt with the
question in the true light. The
testator, a domiciled New Yorker,
left real estate in New Jersey,
which he directed by his will
should be converted into personalty by his executors and distributed among certain - collateral
The question was
kinsmen.
whether the tax was chargeable
upon the proceeds of such foreign
real estate, the distributees being
domiciled New Yorkers. It was
held that the property being
tangible property, situate beyond
the State, no taxation imposed by
New York could be charged against
it.
"The question of the right of a
State to tax," said the Court, "is
one of fact, and cannot turn upon
theories or fictions, which, however serviceable to adjust the rights
of parties, were never intended to
furnish a basis of constitutional
power." The conversion effected
by a court of equity is a notional
conversion designed to prevent an
injury or to better carry out the
intention of the parties: Ackroyd
v. Smithson, I Bro. C. C., 5o3 ;
W. & T.'s L. C. in Eq., p. 1027,
"Equity, like nature,
Vol. I.
will do nothing in vain ;" .neither
will a fiction of equity perform the

Ap., iii

surprise. In that case a testator
domiciled in Pennsylvania devised
land situate in New Jersey to his executors, to be sold to pay pecuniary
legacies to certain collateral heirs.
It was held that the land passed to
the legatee as money, and hence,
being subject to the law of the testator's domicil, was chargeable with
the collateral inheritance tax. "As
the order to sell was imperative and
absolute, and worked a conversion,

.

.

.

we have no choice to

regard it as other than personalty.
As such it must be regarded as
passing by the law of the domicile."
The notion that real estate and
everything pertaining to its devolution, transmission and tenure is
governed and controlled by the le-v
rei sit& has been confirmed by a
host of authorities of long standing.
Story's Conf. Laws, 8th
Ed. by Bigelow, and cases cited.
Moreover, it is a vital principle in
the interstate law of this country,
and one which probably, more
than any other, has maintained
the equilibrium and avoided the
clashing of the taxing powers of
the several States.
To charge the succession of foreign real estate with the payment
of collateral inheritance tax is inconsistent with the spirit of such
taxation. Land situate abroad and

B. Rep.,

1o96.)
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feat of bringing within the jurisdiction of the taxing State that
which cannot otherwise be taxed,
because of the exclusive rights of
the sovereignty where the thing is
located.
It seems then that in Pennsylvania the question whether land
beyond the jurisdiction of the taxing State is to be charged with the
duty, depends upon the legal nature of the realty at the time of its
passing from the person who died
seized or possessed thereof. In
Drayton's Ap., 61 Pa., 172, real
estate in Minnesota was directed
by a Pennsylvanian testator to be
sold "by his executors in their
discretion . . . on such terms
as to them shall seem expedient.
. . . " It was held, that the language of the decedent indicated a
mere authority to sell, and not a
positive direction, and, hence, did
not work the conversion of the
realty.
"SHARSWOOD, J.: Had thelawof
Minnesota so provided, it would
have been liable to a collateral inheritance tax in that State. The
executors could be compelled to
prove the will, and take out letters
testamentary there; and there, also,
to have settled their account of the
proceeds of sale. The land, and of
course its proceeds, were under the
jurisdiction of that State.
We must -consider the case as if
this Minnesota land had been all
the land the testator had; and as
if it had been sold under the
power, and the proceeds distributed
abroad. Surely, the bringing them
into this State and depositing thizm
in the bank account of the executor
along with other funds of the
estate can make no difference.
See Hood's Ap., 9 Harris, io6;
Comm. v. Coleman, 52 Pa., 468.

In England, the case of Forbes
v. McKenzie, L. R., o Eq-., 178, at
first sight appears to accord with
the Pennsyfvania doctrine, but an
examination discloses that there
the property at the time of the decedent's death was personalty. An
English testator had bequeathed
his interest in a partnership, which
was partly composed of land in
Bombay, to an English legatee.
Upon the ground that the decedent
bequeathed his interest,rather than
the siecific thing itself, the legacy
duty was held to attach: Atty.Gen. v. Brunning, 4 H. & N., 94;
Watson v. Swift, 8 Beav., 368; Constance v. Bradshaw, 4 Hare, 315.
2. Personal Property.-The personal property of a decedent, wherever its situs, and, as has been
shown, his real property within
the taxing State, passing to individuals of the proper degree of consanguinity, are taxable under the
collateral inheritance laws: Magee
v. Grima, 8 How., 490; U. S. v.
Hufinewell, 13 Fed. Rep., 617;
Chatfield v. Berchtoldt, L. R., 7
Ch. App., 192; In re Llrvin, i C.
& J., 151; Atty.-Gen. v. Napier, 6
Exch., 217; Forbes v. Steven, L.
R., io Eq., 178; Orcutt's Ap., 97
Pa., 184; Comm. v. Smith, 5 Pa.,
143; Alexander's Ap., 3 P. L. J.
(Clark), 87; Zn re Short's Est., 16
Pa., 66; State'v. Dalyrymple, i7
At. Rep., 82; S. C., 70 Md., 294;
Alvaney v. Powell, 2 Jones' Eq.,
51; People v. Commrs., V1 Hun,,
312.
But, -with respect to the personal property of non-residents
within the taxing State, different
jurisdictions have adopted different
rules, which it may be convenient
to discuss separately.
(a) English Rule.-In .the cases
of Atty.-Gen. v. Cockerill, I Price,
165, and Atty.-Gen. v. Beatson, 7
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Price, decided in 7815, it was resolved that the situs of personal
property, regardless of the domicile of the decedent, was the test
of liability for succession duty.
After what may very properly be
called a thirty years' war, in 1845,
during which period each succeeding case was a battle as to
whether the domicile of the decedent or the silts of the property
should be the determining factor,
it was adjudged, after two arguments in the House of Lords, that
the domicile of the decedent was
the decisive test, and that a consistent interpretation would be given
to the maxim, "Mobilia sequunhir
fiersonam," by exempting personal
property of all kinds, though
actually located in Great Britain, from both legacy and succession duty, where the decedent
at the time of his death was not a
domiciled Englishman: Thompson
v. Atty.-Gen., 12 Cl. & Fin., i. The
cases showing this development
are: Pipon v. Pipon, Ambleri 25;
Thorne v. Watkins, 2 Ves. Sr.,
35; Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick,
cited in Bruce v. Bruce, 5 Ves. Jr.,
750; Logan v. Fairlie, 2 Sin. &
Stu., 284; Atty.-Gen. v. Jackson,
S Bligh U. R., i5; Jackson v.
Forbes, 2 Cr. & J., 382; Arnold v.
Arnold, 2 Myl. & Cr., 256; Est. of
Ervin, I Cr. & J., x51.
"We cannot consider that any
distinction can properly be made
between debts due to the testator
from persons resident in the county
in which the testator is domiciled at the time of his death, and
debts due to him from debtors resident in another and different
county, but that all such debts do
equally form part of the personal
property of the testator or intestate, and must all follow the

369.

same rule, namely, the law of the
domicile of the testator or intestate:" Thompson v. Atty. -Gen.,
12 Cl. & Fin., I.
Thus, after an experience of
thirty years, during which period
the confusion incident to taxing
personal property, because of its
situs rather than the domicile of'
its owner, was abundantly manifested, the House of Lords returned
to the wise, if not lucrative, rule
which makes the test of liability
depend upon the domicile of the.
decedent.
But the principle of Thompson.
v. Atty.-Gen. was qualified where
the foreign decedent having given
an English character to his property in England by appointingEnglish trustees under an English
settlement, it was held that the
succession to such property was,
liable to the duty regardless of the
domicile of the decedent: In re
Cigala's Settlement, 7 Ch. D., 35 1;
Atty.-Gen. v. Campbell, L. R., 5
Eng. & Ir. Ap., 524; Re Badart's
Trusts, L. R., io Eq., 288; Re Capdeirelle, 2 H. & C., 985.
The theory of these decisions in
no wise conflicts with the principle
that the domicile of the decedent
is the basis of the imposition. If
the foreign decedent invokes the
aid of English law to assist him in
executing some testamentary wish,
it is only fair that he should pay
the price for such assistance upon
the same footing as a native. (Seeopinion of Sir GEORGE JESSEL,
In re Cigala's Settlement, 7 Ch,
Div., 351).
(b) The American Rule.-The
succession to personal property is
governed exclusively by the law of
the actual domicile of the testator
at the time of his death. It is of
no consequence what the" former
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domicile of the decedent may have government and laws. Accordbeen, or what is the actual situs of
ingly, there seems to be no place for
the fiction of which we are speakthe personal property at the time
of his death: Story Conf. of Laws, .ing mobilia"personam sequitntur
? 481, et seq. Therefore, the suc- in a well-adjusted system of taxacession of personal property may tion:" Hoyt v. Conner, 23 N. Y.,
be taxed, regardless of whether the
224, 228. See also Guillander v.
property is within or without the flowell, 35 N. Y., 657; Graham v.
The First National Bank, 84 N. Y.,
limits of the taxing State: Orcutt's
Ap., 97 Pa., 184; Short's Estate, 16 393; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt., 152;
Pa., 63; Dos Passos, Col. Inh. Tax,
DosPassos on bollat. Inher., 37-92.
P. 79; State v. Dalyrymple, 70 Md.,
To define accurately what kind
294; S. C., 17 Atl. Rep., 82; Alof property may be legally revaney v. Powell, 2 Jones' Eq., 5i; garded as within a State, it is now
rather difficult, if not impossible, to
Thompson v. Atty.-Gen., 12 Cl. &
determine. (See Dos Passos, Ch.
Fin., i.
It has been shown that the ex- Residents and Non- residents.)
isting English law logically applies
Tangible property of all kinds may
the rule embodied in the maxim,
safely be said to be "within a
inobiliasequunturfpersonam. But
State" for- purposes of the tax:
the American -Courts have unaniState v. Dalyrymple, 70 Md.,.297;
mously rejected all consistent inS. C., 17 At. Rep., 82; Comm. v.
Smith, 5 Pa., 142; Orcutt's Ap., 97
terpretations of the rule in so far
as it prevents a State, not the
Pa., 179; Comm.'s Ap., io Casey,
domicile of the decedent, from tax- 204; Strode v'. Comm., 2 P. F.
ing the succession of personalty
Smith, i8r.
having an actual situs within the
The Pennsylvania idea of what
taxing State: Eyre v. Jacob, 14
constitutes "within the State" is
Gratt. (Va.), 431; Peters v. Lynchrather peculiar. In Orcutt's Ap.,
burg, 76 Va., 92; Schofield v.
97 Pa., 197, a resident of New
Lynchburg, 78 Va., 366; Strode v. Jersey deposited with a PhilaComm., 52 Pa., 182; Clymer v.
delphia trust company for safe
keeping certain United States
Comm., 52 Pa., 189; Herman's Ap.,
i6 W. N. C., 210; Orcutt's Ap., 97
bonds. He died in New Jersey,
Pa., 185; Mager v. Grima, 8 How.
where administration on his estate
(U. S.), 493; Carpenter v. Pa., 17
was duly granted. The trust comHow. (U. S.), 463; Frederickson v. pany declined.to surrender these
bonds to the New Jersey executor
La., 23 How. (U: S.), 447; Wallace
vz. Myers, 38 Fed. Rep., 184; Tyson
unless ancillary letters should be
State, 28 Md., 577; Dalyrymple's
taken out in Pennsylvania. This
having been done, the bonds were
Case, io Md., 298; Matter of Howard, 5 Dem. (N. Y.), 487; Matter
received from the trust company
of McPherson, 104 N. Y., 318.
and, being overdue, were collected,
"I can think of no more appro- and thereupon the collateral inpriate exercise of the sovereignty
heritance tax was demanded and
the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia
of a State or nation over property
situate within it and protected by
ordered it to be paid. This order
its laws than to compel it to con- was reversed upon the ground that
tribute toward the maintenance of the bonds being "simply evidences
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of indebtedness . . . were con-structively within the possession of
the owner."
The rule of Orcutt's Appeal was
developed in Comm.'s Ap., ii W. N.
C., 492, where the Court, in deciding that the bonds, stocks and
various loans of private and public corporations of Pennsylvania
.and elsewhere, owned by a Cuban
decedent, were exempt from the
tax, declared that the Pennsylvania
statutes "were intended to embrace
only personal property of a tangible nature, andnotmereevidences
-of indebtedness which have no
-situs, but follow the owner's domicile."
In the principal case, however,
it is seen that the tax was held to
apply to an interest in the stock of
.a limited partnership association,
incorporated under the Act of x874,
having an extensive plant, consisting of real estate, mills, etc., within
the State.
"If, according to the true intent
,and meaning of the Act of 1887,
the 'interest'
thus bequeathed
was properly situated within this
-State,it is clearly subject to collateral inheritance tax. We are un.able to understand why it was not.
The partnership property was
largely made up of land, merchan-disc, grain and other personal
-property which had a visible, tangible existence and an actual situs
in this State. . . As a gen.eral rule, intangible personal property of a non-resident, such as
bonds, mortgages and other choses
in action, is governed as to its situs
by the fiction of law above noticed,
and hence such property ii not
subject to collateral inheritance
taxation under our laws, because
it is not situated within the state."
Ter STERRETT, J.
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But whatever the confusion in
the cases, Pennsylvania authorities
seem to warrant the statement that
wherever the property of a nonresident having an an actual situs
within the State has an actual,
tangible, habitual existence, it is
chargeable with the tax: See, generally, Orcutt's Ap., 97 Pa., 179;
Commonwealth's Ap., 1iW. N. C.,
492; Del Busto's Est., 23 W. N. C.,
I6; Bennett's Ap., 37 Pitts. Leg.
Jour., 316; McKean v. Northampton Co., 49 Pa., 519; Kintzing v.
Hutchinson, 34Leg. Int., 365.
In Maryland and in New York
all property of whatever kind,
whether tangible or simply evidenced by the presence of stocks,
bonds and the like, having an actual situs within the State, are

"within the State" for the pur-

poses of the tax, regardless of the
domicile of the owner. In Dalyrymple's Ap., 70 Md., 294, cited by
Mr. Dos Passos as the leading case
in this country, certificate of National Bank stock, Missouri State
bonds, and some cash bequeathed
by a non-resident to his brother,
also a non-resident, was held liable
to the tax. "No reason has been
assigned," remarked Justice MCSHERRY,"

why the broad language

of the statute and the evident design
of the legislature should be so narrowed and restricted as to exempt
from this tax the estate of a nonresident actually here, notwithstanding that some property may
for other purposes be treated as
constructively elsewhere.. . . The
imposition of the tax cannot depend upon the mere incidental
residence of the owner."
In Romaine's Ap., 127 N. Y., So,
a domiciled Virginian for about
three years prior to his death
"was the lessee of a box in a safe
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deposit company in the city of
New York, in which he kept certain securities, consisting of stocks
and bonds of different corporations and a mortgage upon real
estate in said city, as well as sev.eral pass books showing deposits
by him in various savings banks in
the same place to a considerable amount." It was held that the
property was subject to the tax
under the Collateral Inheritance
Chap. 483, Laws of
Tax Act (?.i,
1885, as amended by Chap. 713,
Laws of 1887).
Under the language of the Act
of 1888 it was held that property
within the State, either real or
personal, which passes by will or
intestacy from a non-resident decedent to collateral relative or
strangers, was not liable to the tax,
and that it was limited in its effects
to property so passing from resident
decedents: Matter of Euston, 113
N. Y., 174; Matter of Taulane, 5I
Hun., 213; Matter of Clark, 9 N.Y.
Supp., 444.
The Act of 1887, however, remedied the want of scope of the origiiial Act, and no language could be
more sweeping: "All property
which shall pass by will, or by the
intestate laws of this State, from
any person who may die seized or
possessed of the same while a resi-

dent of this State, or if such decedent was not a resident of this Stateat the time of death, which property or any part thereof shall bewithin this State,'" etc. It was upon
this enactment that the Court decided Romaine's Appeal.
From this rather limited review
it is not hard to foresee that clashing of the succession duty laws of'
the various States which will doubtless impress on American courts.
the same lesson which induced the
House of Lords, a half century ago,
to rigidly adhere to the maxim
that "personal property follows
the domicile of the owner."
Addenda.-In the valuable treatise of Mr. DoS PASSOS, at pp.
96 and 97, will be found a digest ofthe American decision on what is
tangible and intangible property
within the purview of the collateral inheritance tax statutes.
The following cases support theconstitutional power of a State
to give property within its jurisdiction a special situs for the purposes of collateral inheritance tax:.
Alvaney v. Powell, 2 Jones' Eq.,
51; State v. Brevard, Phillips' Eq.,
141; People v. Sherwood, 113 N.
Y., 183; Matter of Vinot, 7 N. Y.
St., 65o; Matter of Romaine, 12T
N. Y., 18o.
JoHx A. MCCARTHY

